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1. Executive  Summary 
Recent years have seen a number of initiatives aimed at 
reducing the social and economic costs of international 
sovereign debt crises by promoting a more orderly (and 
hence more timely) resolution of such crises. Some initia-
tives have actually been implemented by the respective 
parties involved  : contractual Collective Action Clauses 
(CACs) are inserted into the documentation of new bond 
issues under US law, and a number of emerging econo-
mies and private creditors’ associations have agreed upon 
the text of non legally binding “Principles for stable capi-
tal ﬂ  ows and fair debt restructuring in emerging markets” 
(hereinafter called “the Principles”). Other initiatives 
have been shelved, in particular the so-called “statutory 
approaches” (such as the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism, SDRM, initially proposed by the First Deputy 
Managing Director of the IMF, Anne Krueger).
These initiatives, concerning in particular the provision 
of adequate information and addressing co-ordination 
problems among creditors, perhaps did not pay sufﬁ  cient 
attention to the sometimes kaleidoscopic general legal 
framework surrounding sovereign debt crises.
Indeed, under international law, several legal norms exist 
that could impact upon the rights and obligations of the 
different parties involved in sovereign debt restructur-
ing. Among them are the numerous Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs). Such BITs in essence aim at attracting for-
eign direct investment into less developed and emerging 
economies, by guaranteeing foreign investors the right 
to individual protection (and, if need be, to appropriate 
defence and compensation).
In view of the substantive differences, legal as well as 
economic, between their nature, aim and effects, one 
would not expect BITs to interfere in any way with crisis 
resolution initiatives such as CACs. However, this article 
indicates that there are sound legal arguments permitting 
private creditors to invoke the protection granted by BITs. 
That possibility could affect the incentives for different 
classes of creditors either to participate in a debt restruc-
turing or to hold out. The rights granted to individual 
creditors by a rather general legal framework (BITs) could 
hence impact upon the functioning of another, very spe-
ciﬁ  c framework, designed to establish a proper balance 
between the public good of an orderly and timely resolu-
tion of a debt crisis, and the preservation of the rights of 
private creditors as a group (CACs).
Such interaction between two different spheres is unwar-
ranted, in particular as the amounts involved could become 
signiﬁ  cant  : in the case of Argentina, the debt remaining 
unrestructured after the closing of the offer amounts to 
19.6 billion USD, or 11.5 p.c. of GDP. The potential direct 
and indirect costs involved are thus substantial.
A solution to the problem should be sought at the inter-
national – and preferably the multilateral – level. Both a 
multilateral agreement on investment and a multilateral 
statutory mechanism for debt restructuring could clarify 
the situation overall, with the latter presenting the advan-
tages of transparency and consistency. In the end, this 
article therefore adds to the arguments in favour of the 
international community resuming the work on a sover-
eign debt restructuring mechanism.154
The paper is organised as follows  : Section 2 will present 
the characteristics of BITs and of recent initiatives on a 
more orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises and their 
differences, and Section 3 will review classic features 
of BITs. The likelihood of interference between BITs and 
CACs will be examined under Section 4, and the nature 
of such interference will be further explored in Section 5. 
Section 6 will propose ways to moderate such interference. 
2.   BITs and recent initiatives on a more 
orderly resolution of sovereign debt 
crises
Although both BITs and recent initiatives on a more 
orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises (see Box 1), in 
particular CACs, impact on the balance of power between 
a sovereign State and foreign creditors or investors, they 
differ substantially on several points :
–    their primary aim  : BITs aim at attracting foreign direct 
investment, in general, into less developed and emer-
ging markets. In particular, such investment is promo-
ted by granting individual rights to protection to all the 
nationals of another State who make an investment. 
By contrast, CACs impact upon the contractual rela-
tionship between a State and a debt holder, with 
regard to a speciﬁ  c portfolio investment. They aim at 
preventing and, if need be, limiting the overall costs of 
a debt crisis, by addressing information provision and 
coordination problems between creditors. Although 
factual evidence points in the opposite direction, it 
is widely believed that the insertion of CACs tends 
to make the bond issue concerned less attractive for 
foreign investors ;
–   their impact on the balance of power :  whereas  BITs 
assign rights and security to individual investors in 
relation to a sovereign State (the host country), CACs 
provide a sovereign with the legal tools for increasing 
the orderliness of a debt workout, while preserving the 
rights of its creditors as a group (and hence limiting the 
rights of individual creditors holding out) ;
–   their origin : BITs appeared in the early 1960s and were 
mainly concluded between Western European countries 
and their former African colonies. Since the 1990s, the 
number of BITS has proliferated rapidly around the 
world  (1) (see Chart 1). Up to now, more than 2,300 
BITs have been ratiﬁ   ed, with more than 1,000 for 
the EU members, and more than 60 for the Belgium-
Luxembourg Economic Union  (2). On the other hand, the 
renewed interest in CACs (under New York Law, as they 
are a standard device under English Law) ﬁ  nds its origin 
in the aftermath of the Mexican sovereign bond crisis 
in 1994. Standard clauses have been proposed by the 
ofﬁ  cial as well as by the private community, and Mexico 
has led by example, by introducing CACs in an issue 
under New York Law in February 2003. The example 
was followed by many other countries, and (some cate-
gories of) CACs are becoming a market standard under 
New York Law as well ;
–   their legal nature  : BITs are treaties, a public law instru-
ment of a general and non-speciﬁ  c nature, while CACs 
are clauses inserted into one speciﬁ   c contract, and 
belong to the sphere of private law ;
–   the relationship between the home country  /  sovereign 
debtor and investors/creditors  : on the one hand, BITs 
being treaties concluded between States (the home 
country and the host country), there is stricto sensu 
no contractual relationship between the host country 
and the foreign investor, who is a third party to BITs. 
Nevertheless, through the protection granted by BITs, 
rights are created directly in favour of investors. This 
is quite normal in international law, and is known as 
direct applicability. On the other hand, CACs ﬁ  gure in 
legal instruments concluded directly between a State 
(the sovereign debtor) and several private parties (its 
creditors). Therefore, unlike the protection granted by 
BITs, CACs’ effects are based directly on a contractual 
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(1)  This is similar to what has happened in investment cases between host countries 
and investors in international arbitration. For instance, from its launch in 1966 
until the beginning of 2002, the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) had registered 95 cases ; since then, the caseload 
of ICSID has grown exponentially by another 73 cases. The ICSID is part of the 
World Bank Group and was created by the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Washington, 
18 March 1965. At the end of 2004, 142 States had ratiﬁ  ed this Convention. 
ICSID is also competent for disputes involving non-member host countries which 
have accepted its jurisdiction (through its Additional Facility Rules).
(2)  Investments fall within the scope of the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union 
(BLEU) Convention. Therefore, BITs are concluded on behalf of the BLEU.155
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Box 1  –    Recent initiatives on a more orderly resolution of sovereign debt 
crises
In countries with excessive debt levels, a timely and orderly restructuring of sovereign debt may be appropriate 
to avoid problems of debt overhang and debt panics. Debt overhang may inefﬁ  ciently reduce investment and 
growth in the debtor country, so that debt restructuring might beneﬁ  t not only debtors but also creditors overall. 
Debt panics due to self-fulﬁ  lling runs by creditors may entail systemic risks involving capital ﬂ  ight, exchange rate 
problems and banking crises affecting the creditor countries also.
Timely debt workouts, however, may be hampered by coordination problems due to diverging incentives for the 
creditors. Individually, creditors have incentives to race to the courthouse to call in their claims against overextended 
countries or to hold out in debt renegotiation, thereby impeding or delaying the conclusion of debt restructuring. 
Renegotiation encourages free riding as a debt write-down by other creditors will increase the capacity of the 
debtor to repay the remaining creditors. A collective action problem arises as the destructive race to liquidate 
assets injures the economic performance of the debtors so much that the creditors suffer collectively  (1).
In addition to promoting the provision of timely and accurate information, recent initiatives on a more orderly 
resolution of sovereign debt crises, in particular, address such collective action problems.
CACs are clauses to be incorporated in sovereign debt contracts and aiming mainly at making the process for 
restructuring sovereign debt more orderly by :
– fostering early dialogue, coordination and communication among creditors and a sovereign debtor ;
–   ensuring that there are effective means for creditors and debtors to re-contract, without a minority of 
debt-holders being able to obstruct the process ;
–   ensuring that disruptive legal action by individual creditors does not hamper a workout that is under way, while 
protecting the interests of the creditor group.
CACs thus tend to shift away from the individual investor/creditor, aiming at protecting the public interest while 
preserving the interests of investors/creditors as a group.
The “Principles for stable capital ﬂ  ows and fair debt restructuring in emerging markets” are the result of a joint 
effort, supported by the ofﬁ  cial community, of emerging markets issuers (primarily Brazil, Korea, Mexico and 
Turkey) and private sector representatives (e.g. the Institute of International Finance and the International Primary 
Markets Association). Their aim is to provide a market-based, voluntary and ﬂ  exible framework for cooperation 
between debtors and creditors in order to contain crises at an early stage and to facilitate debt restructurings. 
The Principles are based on four pillars : 
–   transparency and timely ﬂ  ow of information ; 
– close debtor-creditor dialogue and cooperation to avoid restructuring ;
– good faith actions during debt restructurings by debtors and creditors ;
– fair treatment of all creditors. 
In view  of their voluntary nature, the Principles are not legally binding, and none of their provisions is deemed to 
constitute a waiver of legal rights.
The Principles were subscribed to by the public and private parties mentioned above in November 2004 ; they were 
welcomed by the G20 (20-21 November 2004).
(1)  Debt forgiveness might beneﬁ  t not only debtors, but also creditors if the write-down of nominal claims was more than offset by an increased likelihood that the 
country might repay its remaining debt. For further arguments, see Rogoff K. and J. Zettelmeyer (2002), ”Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns : A History of Ideas 
1976-2001”, IMF Staff Papers, 49 (3), 470-507.156
From their substantially different legal nature and fea-
tures, as well as from their diverging economic rationale, 
one would tend to conclude that there should be no 
major interference between BITs and CACs. The question 
arises, however, whether the protection granted by BITs to 
some individual creditors may not affect their incentives to 
litigate or to hold out in a debt renegotiation process, and 
thus interfere with the implementation of the framework 
provided by CACs. Hence, the protection granted by BITs 
and the particular clauses they contain in this respect 
should be further analysed.
3.  An introduction to BITs
BITs around the world share a lot of common features  : 
they deﬁ   ne the kind of investments that they protect 
(3.1), they contain some classic clauses (3.2) and they 
address the issue of discrimination between foreign inves-
tors (3.3).
3.1  Investments protected by BITs
The traditional aim of BITs is to promote and to protect 
investments reciprocally (although it is clear that the 
economically less strong partner hopes to beneﬁ  t most). 
Investments are traditionally deﬁ  ned by BITs as any kind 
of assets invested in the host country, including, though 
not exclusively, property and property-related rights, rights 
in companies, monetary claims and titles to performance, 
copyrights and industrial property rights, and concessions 
and similar rights. For instance, the deﬁ  nition included in 
the BLEU model text is :
“The term ‘investments’ shall mean any kind of assets and 
any direct or indirect contribution in cash, in kind or in 
services, invested or reinvested in any sector of economic 
activity.
The following shall more particularly, though not exclusi-
vely, be considered as investments for the purpose of this 
Agreement :
a)   movable and immovable property as well as any other 
rights in rem, such as mortgages, liens, pledges, 
usufruct and similar rights ;
b)   shares, corporate rights and any other kind of 
shareholdings, including minority or indirect ones, 
in companies constituted in the territory of one 
Contracting Party ;
c)   bonds, claims to money and to any performance 
having an economic value ;
d)   copyrights, industrial property rights, technical 
processes, trade names and goodwill ;
e)   concessions granted under public law or under 
contract, including concessions to explore, develop, 
extract or exploit natural resources.
Changes in the legal form in which assets and capital 
have been invested or reinvested shall not affect their 
designation as ‘investments’ for the purpose of this 
Agreement.”
The investors concerned are deﬁ   ned as the nationals 
(citizens and companies) of each Contracting Party.
3.2  Classic clauses of BITs
The goal of BITs is not the opening of markets as such 
(as opposed to the draft Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment – MAI – of the OECD (1)) but to promote invest-
ments in sectors which the host country authorities have 
already opened up unilaterally. This promotion implies 
protection, through a limitation of the powers of the host 
country in its capacity as a sovereign State, in order to 
provide legal security to foreign investors or investments, 
in an environment in which such security cannot be taken 
for granted.
Although the interpretation of some clauses may differ 
between the major geographical regions of the world, the 
content of BITs is rather similar, irrespective of domestic 
legal systems. BITs generally contain clauses on :
–   promotion and admittance of investments ;
–   protection stricto sensu of investments (fair and equita-
ble treatment, full protection and security, prohibition 
of unjustiﬁ  ed or discriminatory measures) ;
–   national treatment of investors ;
–   most favoured nation (MFN – see below) ;
–   expropriation (see point 5.1) ;
–   free transfer of capital (see point 5.3) ;
–   subrogation of investors by the home country or by its 
credit insurance institution ;
–   settlement of investor-host State disputes (see point 5.2) ;
–   settlement of State-State disputes ;
–   umbrella clause  : BITs usually offer the investor the 
right to choose the legal regime which is the most 
favourable to the investor (contractual agreement with 
the host country, BIT, multilateral agreement, laws 
of the host country… – existing or to be subscribed 
to by the host country).
(1)  Between 1995 and 1998, the MAI was negotiated within the OECD (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Hong-Kong, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic 
being invited as observers). Under the terms of reference, the MAI was to be a 
”free standing international treaty, open to all OECD Members and the European 
Communities, and to accession by non-OECD Member Countries”. Its proposed 
objective was to ”provide a broad multilateral framework for international 
investment with high standards for the liberalisation of investment regimes 
and investment protection and with effective dispute settlement procedures”. 
Negotiations ceased in December 1998, due to strong international criticisms (too 
liberal text, issues of environment and labour insufﬁ  ciently addressed, negotiation 
of the text in a club of developed countries…).157
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3.3  BITs and discrimination
Despite the broad similarity in content, BITs could be a 
source of discrimination between investors from different 
countries, but as a rule such potential discrimination is 
addressed by the MFN clause. According to this clause, 
investors and their investments will be treated no less 
favourably than the investors from other countries.
The only traditional exception to the MFN clause concerns 
privileges granted to investors from certain countries by 
virtue of participation in or association with a free trade 
area, customs union, common market or any other form 
of regional economic organisation.
Discrimination will, however, remain possible between 
investors from countries which have concluded BITs with 
the country hosting the investments and those from coun-
tries which have not concluded BITs, or those which have 
concluded BITs with a more limited scope. This potential 
discrimination can affect bondholders’ class actions. 
Indeed, if BITs provide a particular class of bondholders 
with additional enforcement mechanisms  /  legal protec-
tion grounds in case of sovereign default, that may pro-
vide them with more incentives for legal action, resulting 
eventually in uncoordinated litigation.
4.   The likelihood of interferences 
between BITs and CACs
There is no real consensus on classifying bonds as invest-
ments falling within the scope of BITs, but there is a grow-
ing trend towards doing so (4.1). Economic considerations 
may also shed some light on the issue (4.2). Finally, the 
possibility that one legal framework could prevail over the 
other will be examined (4.3).
4.1   BITs and bonds : Do bonds fall within the scope 
of BITs ?
Neither legal practice nor legal doctrine offers an unam-
biguous answer to the question whether sovereign bonds 
qualify as investments under the terms of BITs. The issue 
can be addressed at two levels :
–   as mentioned under point 3.1, the deﬁ  nition by BITs of 
the notion of investment is rather broad and exempli-
ﬁ  ed by a non exclusive list of categories. Two of those 
categories (monetary claims and rights in companies (1)), 
open the door for the inclusion of bonds. Moreover, 
several BITs (European-style BITs – including the BLEU 
model text and most of the treaties entered into by 
the BLEU –, US BITs…) explicitly mention bonds in 
their deﬁ   nition of the term “investment”. This was 
also the case with the draft text of the MAI (see 
footnote 1 p. 4). Some BITs, or BITs-like agreements, 
explicitly exclude port-folio investments from the deﬁ  -
nition of “investment” (ASEAN Framework Agreement 
on Investment…). This could be seen as an a contrario 
sign that portfolio investments are covered by the deﬁ  -
nition of “investment” if not explicitly excluded ;
–   cases concerning debt instruments are rather rare in 
international arbitration. However, some recent rulings 
conﬁ   rm the trend mentioned above  (2). Current cases 
involving countries such as Argentina will also probably 
help to shed some light on this issue.
If bonds as such are protected as investments by BITs, 
does this protection extend to bonds issued by a sov-
ereign  ? Some arguments point to a positive answer  : 
ﬁ   rst, the ordinary meaning of “bond” already includes 
governments as possible issuers of bonds  (3). Second, BITs 
explicitly deﬁ  ning bonds as investments do not make any 
distinction between the numerous categories of bonds. 
Moreover, and a contrario, some BITs protecting bonds 
explicitly exclude from their scope bonds issued by a State 
(e.g. Spain – Mexico BIT, 1995). Third, during the MAI 
negotiations, a broad majority was in favour of includ-
ing bonds issued by a public authority in the scope of 
the MAI. However, the discussion was inconclusive about 
potential interference by the MAI in public debt restruc-
turing arrangements, and about the possibility of inserting 
a limited carve-out clause in the MAI to cater for that.
(1)  E.g. “shares or bonds, equity as well as debt”.
(2)  Fedax N.V. v. the Republic of Venezuela, ICSID case no ARB/96/3, Decision on 
objections to jurisdiction, 11 July 1997 (http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
Fedax-1997-Last.pdf) ; Ceskoslovenska Obochodni Banka A.S. v. the Slovak 
Republic, ICSID case no ARB/97/4, Decision on objections to jurisdiction 24 May 1999 
(http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/csob_decision.pdf).
(3)  According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, a bond is “a deed by 
which one person binds himself or herself to pay another ; a (government’s) 
documentary promise to repay borrowed money, usu. with interest ; a debenture ; 
an insurance policy ; a ﬁ  nancial guarantee against the collapse of a company, esp. 
a tour operator etc.” (our underlining). In ﬁ  nancial Law dictionaries, “bond” is “a 
long term, interest bearing instrument issued by a corporation or government to 
provide for a particular ﬁ  nancial need” (our underlining).158
4.2 Economic  considerations
An analysis of the economics underlying the conclusion 
of BITs may also provide some insights into the issue at 
stake.
BITs are concluded with the aim of augmenting more 
legal certainty for investments abroad, and hence 
reducing transaction costs and increasing international 
capital ﬂ  ows. The protection offered by BITs is particularly 
needed in order to increase the ﬂ  ow  of  international 
direct investments, given the high risks involved in risk 
capital ﬁ  nancing.
One would therefore be tempted to exclude bonds, and 
in particular sovereign bonds, from the scope of BITs, as 
these instruments have very little to do with the aim of 
BITs,  i.e. promoting risk capital ﬁ   nancing by non resi-
dents.
It could be argued that sovereign bonds contribute to this 
aim indirectly. Indeed, to the extent that the sovereign 
ﬁ  nds its ﬁ  nancing abroad, a larger amount of domestic 
savings will be available for investment purposes. Such 
reasoning, however, is a long shot, and disregards the 
second important aspect of BITs, next to attracting foreign 
ﬁ  nancing, i.e. transfer of expertise between the home and 
the host country, by establishing long lasting and direct 
links between the economies involved.
4.3   Does one legal framework prevail over the 
other ?
From the considerations in the two paragraphs above, it 
follows that the economic rationale for including bonds 
under the protection framework offered by BITs is weak, 
but that sound legal arguments could be invoked for 
doing so nevertheless.
Where BITs exist alongside CACs, for instance, the 
question arises whether one legal framework should 
normally prevail over the other. One might think that the 
umbrella clause (see above, point 3.2) would enable CACs 
to prevail over the protection granted by BITs. However, 
this interpretation of the umbrella clause would directly 
contradict its goal, which is to ensure the most favour-
able treatment for the investor, and should therefore be 
rejected. CACs could also be considered as an exception 
to BITs according to the general principle of international 
law lex specialis derogat legi generali (the more speciﬁ  c 
text prevails over the general). However, there is no real 
guarantee that this principle would apply in this case, as 
there is not really any direct link between BITs and CACs, 
and it is therefore not self-evident that CACs should be 
classed as a speciﬁ  c implementation of the more general 
principles contained in BITs. Moreover, the application of 
the lex specialis principle was recently ruled out in some 
international arbitration cases on the speciﬁ  c jurisdiction 
issue, allowing investors to refer a contract dispute to an 
arbitral tribunal on the basis of BITs despite the existence 
of different dispute settlement clauses in the contract (1).
5. Speciﬁ  c BITs clauses
In a scenario of CACs existing alongside BITs, several 
BITs clauses can interfere with the initiatives on a more 
orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises. In order to 
avoid becoming too technical, only three – the most 
obvious – cases are illustrated hereunder. These relate to 
the expropriation clause (5.1), the settlement of investor-
State disputes clause (5.2), and the clause on the free 
transfer of capital (5.3).
5.1  The expropriation clause
Most BITs contain a clause stating that investments must 
not be expropriated or nationalised, except for a public 
purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance 
with due process of law and against payment of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation. This rule is 
conﬁ  rmed by numerous cases and is considered part of 
customary international law.
“Expropriation”, or “deprivation of ownership”, or 
“taking”, are used by BITs but seldom deﬁ  ned by them. 
However, the ordinary meaning (to legally take away 
something for public use or beneﬁ   t) is self-evident. 
“Nationalisation” belongs to the same category but 
implies an operation on a larger scale.
Measures taken in a different legal form but having the 
same effect are increasingly treated in the same way as 
expropriation and nationalisation stricto sensu. Those 
measures are often qualiﬁ  ed as indirect (or creeping, or 
de facto) expropriation.
(1) See  Lanco International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID case no ARB/97/6, 
Preliminary decision on jurisdiction, 8 December 1998, 40 ILM (2001) ; Salini 
Construttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID case 
no ARB/00/4, Decision on jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, 42 ILM (2003); Compania 
de Aguas des Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
case no ARB/97/3, Award, 21 November 2000, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
cases/ada_AwardoftheTribunal.pdf ; LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and 
LG&E International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID case no ARB/02/1, Decision of the 
arbitral tribunal on objections to jurisdiction, 30 April 2004, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/LGE-DecisiononJurisdiction-English.pdf ; Enron Corporation and 
Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID case no ARB/01/3, Decision on 
jurisdiction, 2 August 2004, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
Enron-DecisiononJurisdiction-FINAL-English.pdf.159
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There is no deﬁ   nition of indirect expropriation in BITs 
(except in the new US model BIT  (1)). However, jurispru-
dence and the literature lead to a deﬁ  nition of indirect 
expropriation as interference by a state in the use of an 
investment or with the enjoyment of the beneﬁ  ts, even 
where the investment is not seized and the legal title to 
the investment is not affected. 
Measures taken in the context of a sovereign debt crisis, 
for instance a bond restructuring, can seriously affect the 
economic value of the assets concerned. Could such a 
restructuring be considered as an indirect expropriation, 
falling therefore within the scope of BITs, and requiring 
compensation  ? The line between indirect expropriation 
and the sovereignty of a State is very thin. For instance, 
measures taken in the general interest come under the 
State’s right to regulate, and are not considered as indirect 
expropriation but as regulations which do not give rise to 
any compensation.
This speciﬁ  c issue is not addressed by legal texts, but an 
analysis of jurisprudence shows the existence of several 
criteria determining whether an indirect expropriation 
has occurred  : the degree of interference, its dura-
tion, its sole effect on the investor, its purpose and its 
context…. Among those criteria, some could be help-
ful in deciding whether or not a restructuring qualiﬁ  es 
as an indirect expropriation  : (i) the degree of interfer-
ence, understood as the severity of the economic impact 
caused by a government action, (ii) the purpose or the 
context, for instance an economic crisis and its severity, 
(iii) the interference with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations, when the restructuring is not fair for credi-
tors, or (iv) the discriminatory character, if discrimination is 
applied between creditors (between domestic and foreign 
creditors, between institutional and small investors, or 
between other classes of creditors).
Nevertheless, there is no jurisprudence on this very pre-
cise issue. Future rulings by the ICSID on several cases 
involving Argentina will certainly be of some relevance on 
this question. Indeed, among creditors of Argentina, the 
Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders is currently 
envisaging using the expropriation clause to challenge the 
Argentine restructuring proposal.
In the case of recent initiatives on a more orderly resolu-
tion of sovereign debt crises, the expropriation clause 
would cause serious interference  : whatever the restruc-
turing terms sanctioned by these initiatives, hold out 
creditors would still be able to request full compensation 
for the indirect expropriation imposed on them.
As creditors have more incentives to hold out when they 
are protected under the umbrella of BITs, the collective 
action problem becomes worse, hampering a timely 
and orderly debt workout. The problem may even be 
exacerbated if the distressed bonds are actively traded 
in secondary markets and acquired by bondholders from 
countries who expect their investments to be protected 
by BITs.
Box 2  –  The sovereign strikes back
This article, as well as other publications on the subject, including some by bondholders, follows the pattern of 
a private bondholder invoking a BIT against a sovereign. However, it seems that, at least in theory, the sovereign 
can also make use of some clauses contained in BITs, against (hold out) bondholders. An avenue of the kind is 
provided by a traditional clause on nationalisation and expropriation.
Most BITs state the general principle that investments by investors of the other contracting party must not 
be nationalised or expropriated, neither directly, nor indirectly. However, it is equally traditional to formulate 
exceptions to this rule. The conditions put forward for such exceptions include provision for the payment of a 
prompt and adequate compensation. The amount of such compensation should be equal to the real value of 
the investment, i.e. the market value on the day preceding the day on which the imminent nationalisation or 
expropriation is decided or becomes common knowledge.
(1) See  http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/
asset_upload_ﬁ  le847_6897.pdf, Annex B, § 4.
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A sovereign could try to invoke this clause against bondholders holding out in a debt restructuring, in order to 
avoid being obliged to reimburse 100 p.c. of the bond’s nominal amount plus interest. For such a defence to be 
successful (i) the restructuring offer must qualify as a nationalisation or expropriation and (ii) the haircut proposed 
must not exceed the discount at which the bond issue concerned was quoted in tempore non suspecto.
We refer to the main text for considerations with regard to the ﬁ  rst condition. The issue of market quotation 
“under normal circumstances”, raised by the second condition, constitutes a factual question. Below is an 
illustration  : the graph plots the quotation of one particular Argentine bond issue contained in the restructuring 
offer (the same pattern applies broadly to other comparable bond issues), while indicating events which could be 





















































CHART 1  MARKET QUOTATION OF A BOND ISSUED BY THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC (AR. REPUBLIC, 9 P.C., DUE 09, EUR) 
AND RELEVANT EVENTS
International rating agencies lower Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating.
S&P lowers Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating further from B+ to B.
Press quotes market sources to report that an IMF package will only delay the default.
IMF announces planned augmentation of Argentina’s stand-by arrangement by 8 billion USD.
Net present value of post-restructured debt (%)
IMF Board approves a 7,2 billion USD stand-by arrangement with Argentina. The Argentine authorities indicate that they intend 
to treat the credit as precautionary.
IMF Board approves augmentation of Argentina’s stand-by arrangement to 13,7 billion USD. At the same time, additional financing
is arranged from official and private sources.
Minister of Economy Cavallo announces a modification of the convertibility law, with the replacement of the dollar by an equally
weighted basket of the dollar and the euro.
Authorities announce the completion of the mega-swap, involving the voluntary exchange of some 29 billion USD in mainly 
near-dated securities for longer-dated, higher-yielding bonds.
Mr. Cavallo announces a package of tax and trade measures to stave off a potential debt default, including a trade compensation
mechanism for exporters and importers. Concern that this is a first step towards full-scale devaluation sends the price of Argentina’s
bonds tumbling as a devaluation would force the government to default on its huge debt.
IMF Board approves augmentation of Argentina’s stand-by arrangement (to 22 billion USD), with up to 3 billion USD set aside
to be used in support of a possible voluntary and market-based operation to increase the viability of Argentina's debt profile.
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5.2  The settlement of investor-State disputes clause
The coordination problems due to divergent incentives for 
creditors in sovereign debt restructurings are compounded 
by the variety of procedures available for the settlement 
of disputes. Different options given to all creditors, or to 
different classes of creditors, may become a source of 
uncoordinated litigation, rendering the solution of collec-
tive action problems even more difﬁ  cult.
Under BITs, a dispute between an investor and a host 
country can be submitted, usually at the option of the 
former, to the national jurisdictions of the country con-
cerned or to international arbitration. For international 
arbitration, BITs propose one or several fora. For instance, 
in the BLEU model text, these fora are the ICSID, ad hoc 
tribunals (set up according to the arbitration rules laid 
down by the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law), the International Court of Arbitration in Paris, 
and the Arbitration Institute in Stockholm.
As a rule, the possibility of submitting the dispute to 
a court of the investor’s choice is conditioned only by 
time constraints, as most BITs reserve some time for the 
amicable settlement of the dispute (consultation, nego-
tiation…), ranging usually between three and twelve 
months. Once this period has elapsed, the dispute can  be 
referred to a court  : the investor does not need to obtain 
the consent of the host country before going to interna-
tional arbitration (such consents are usually irrevocably 
expressed in BITs). Moreover, several BITs even contain an 
explicit clause providing that local remedies do not have 
to be exhausted. 
In contrast, CACs limit an investor’s right of litigation 
(before a domestic court, usually of the same nationality 
as the law applicable to the issue). For instance, the G10 
set of CACs offers the possibility of a stay of legal action, 
providing a sovereign with a breathing space from disrup-
tive litigation during the period in which it is organising 
its affairs after a default, and in anticipation of a restruc-
turing. Another clause concentrates the power to initiate 
litigation within a bondholder representative.
The haircut included in the Argentine offer is generally estimated at between 65 and 70 p.c. Depending on the 
precise date judged as being the moment on which the expropriation was decided or became public knowledge, 
the offer could therefore be judged as being above or below market conditions. Interestingly, market quotation 
has been consistently below 100 p.c., implying that under the terms of the expropriation clause of a BIT, the 
sovereign would never be obliged to reimburse the full nominal amount.
Be that as it may, if and when BITs are judged to apply in cases of debt restructuring, the ultimate outcome of the 
proceedings could be beneﬁ  cial for either the sovereign or the bondholder. BITs could therefore interfere in a very 
complex manner with recent initiatives to promote a more orderly debt crisis resolution.
 2003-09-22
The Argentine authorities announce a new package of measures intended to give a decisive boost to competitiveness through tax
incentives and to make further progress in ensuring fiscal solvency, including a two-phase debt exchange, which is characterised as
”orderly” as opposed to ”voluntary”. Phase I of the debt exchange is aimed mainly at domestic creditors and entails an exchange of
old credit for guaranteed loans to the federal government at substantially lower interest rates and longer maturities, collateralised by
revenue from the financial transaction tax, while phase II is to be directed at international creditors under international conventions.
S&P lowers Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating from CC to SD (selective default) as it characterises the debt swap that is ongoing
in November 2001 as a coerced exchange. The rating is lowered to D on those bonds that are eligible for the domestic debt swap.
The government announces that the first phase of the debt-rescheduling plan had been successful. In order to buy time while the
second stage is completed, the government introduces a partial deposit freeze and capital controls.
The IMF issues a press release indicating that the fifth review under the stand-by arrangement can not be completed at this point.
This also means that the scheduled tranche of 1,3 billion USD will not be released, which the government needs to honour its
debt-repayment schedule.
President Rodriguez Saá declares partial default on Argentina’s sovereign debt (excluding the ”guaranteed loans” that resulted from
the previous debt swap and the debt held with International Financial Institutions). The decision causes few ripples as it was widely
expected.
President Duhalde announces the end of convertibility and the introduction of a dual foreign exchange regime. Argentina actually
misses a payment on its debt.
The pesoisation of government debt under Argentine law is decreed.
The IMF approves a transitional stand-by arrangement for Argentina.
The IMF approves a new three-year stand-by arrangement for Argentina.
Argentina announces the broad outline of its debt restructuring proposal.
11   2001-11-01
12   2001-11-06
13   2001-12-03
 2001-12-05
14   2001-12-24
15   2002-01-03
16   2002-03-08
17   2003-01-24
18   2003-09-20162
5.3  The free transfer of capital clause
This classic clause provides that international transfers relat-
ing to an investment (exempliﬁ  ed by a non exhaustive list) 
can be made freely and without undue delay. Some BITs do 
not limit such free transfer at all, some contain restrictions 
which can vary. A reference to domestic laws and regula-
tions (including exchange controls), or the possibility of sus-
pending the free transfer of capital temporarily in the case 
of balance-of-payment problems are obvious examples.
In the heat of a debt crisis, it could be assessed appropri-
ate to impose temporary exchange controls in order to 
prevent the crisis from being exacerbated by “specula-
tive” capital ﬂ  ows.
If a BIT contracted by the country concerned does not deal 
with the issue explicitly, could the imposition of exchange 
controls possibly be deemed contrary to the free transfer 
of capital ensured by the BIT  ? The issue is not settled by 
jurisprudence, and the doctrine is divided. Some authors 
hold the view that temporary exchange controls would 
indeed constitute a breach of the BIT concerned, while 
others defend the position that the controls would be 
allowed, either on the basis of the clausula rebus sic 
stantibus (all things remaining equal) principle, or on the 
basis of the general principle of necessity. Here again, 
future jurisprudence on Argentina will probably shed 
some light.
In the absence of a global institution having jurisdiction 
over the temporary imposition of exchange controls, such 
a measure is a complex and delicate undertaking, from a 
legal and administrative point of view. If surrounded by 
too high a level of uncertainty, e.g. due to possible incon-
sistency with the rights and obligations stemming from 
BITs, evasive mechanisms could be set up quickly and suc-
cessfully, and the impact on the markets could diminish or 
even become negative, as the main effect of the measure 
could be to add to the anxiety in the markets.
Box 3  –    Belgian law, Euroclear and litigation relating to sovereign 
debt crises
Other factors, such as national legislation, can also interfere with sovereign debt crisis resolution.
Euroclear – an International Central Securities Depository established in Belgium – was recently involved in 
two cases under Belgian law between a sovereign debtor and one of its creditors not participating in a debt 
rescheduling : the Elliott case and the LNC case. 
In 2000, LP Elliott Associates obtained an order from the Brussels Appeals Court preventing Euroclear from 
accepting payment or paying out cash from Peru to discharge the interest due on Peru’s Brady bonds. This order 
was granted without the defendants, Euroclear and Peru, being given the opportunity to present their counter-
arguments. It was based on a broad interpretation of the pari passu provision. According to this interpretation, 
Peru could not make interest payments on its restructured sovereign bonds (Brady bonds) without at the same 
time making proportionate payments to holdout creditors (Elliott). Peru decided to settle amicably with Elliott in 
order to avoid being forced to default on its Brady bonds payments.
In 2003, on the basis of the same interpretation of the pari passu provision, LNC, a US debt collection company, 
obtained an order from the Brussels Commercial Court preventing Euroclear from accepting payment or paying 
out cash in respect of Nicaragua bonds. This order was also granted without the defendants, Euroclear and 
Nicaragua, being given the opportunity to present their counter-arguments. 
The issue raised by those cases was addressed in two ways  : ﬁ  rst, by the (at least) partial reversal of the “Elliott 
jurisprudence”, and second, by an amendment to the Belgian legislation.
Reversal of  the “Elliott jurisprudence” : in 2004, following the appeal lodged by both Nicaragua and Euroclear, the 
Brussels Court of Appeal dismissed LNC’s claim, mainly for the reason that a third party (Euroclear) to a contract 
(between LNC and Nicaragua) cannot be considered as liable for the execution of that contract (which was the 
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result of the appealed order). The Court did not even have to look into the interpretation of the pari passu provision. 
However, LNC lodged a new appeal (pourvoi en cassation), before the Belgian Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation), 
on the grounds that the conclusion of the Brussels Court of Appeal was based on an erroneous interpretation of 
Belgian law. The Belgian Supreme Court is not expected to rule on LNC’s appeal before the end of 2005.
Amendment of the Belgian legislation  : a Belgian law of 28 April 1999 prohibits the attachment of any cash 
settlement account held with the operator of a payment system or of a securities settlement system designated 
by the said law, or with the settlement agent of one of those systems. This law aims to ensure that the smooth 
functioning of a payment or securities settlement system is not paralysed or impaired by an attachment or 
sequestration, or by a court order blocking an account. But Elliott and LNC, with their respective claims, 
circumvented the objective of protection sought by this law, by blocking a payment to be credited to a settlement 
account in a protected system, thus at a stage prior to it being registered in the account. Therefore, in order to 
safeguard the full effect to the 1999 law, the Belgian Government proposed to amend it, by providing that the 
rules also apply to transfers of sums to be credited to a cash settlement account through an intermediary acting 
as cash correspondent (i.e. a Belgian or foreign credit institution). This amendment was adopted by the law of 6 
December 2004 amending insolvency rules concerning credit institutions and insurance undertakings. The law was 
published on 28 December 2004, and entered into force on 7 January 2005. The amended text provides  : “Any 
cash settlement account maintained with the operator of a system or with a cash settlement agent, as well as 
any cash transfer, through a Belgian or foreign credit institution, to be credited to such cash settlement account, 
cannot be attached, put under sequestration or otherwise blocked by any means by a participant (other than the 
operator or the settlement agent), a counterpart or a third party.”
6. Possible  solutions
As already mentioned, interference by BITs is due to the 
progressive extension of their scope and to their increas-
ing number, but also to the fact that recent initiatives on 
a more orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises do not 
pay sufﬁ  ciently due attention to the legal framework sur-
rounding sovereign debt crises.
From the preceding chapter it follows, however, that it 
is uncertain whether the potential interference described 
will occur in real life. Therefore, one could imagine 
leaving things as they are and waiting for the develop-
ment of a jurisprudence. Such a solution could never be 
entirely satisfactory, as due to the case-by-case nature of 
jurisprudence and the lack of unity in international arbi-
tration, complete legal certainty will never be attained. 
Another factor to take into account is that, while the 
overall impact of hold out creditors has usually been 
considered relatively limited until now, the current 
Argentine restructuring, with the hold out creditors 
accounting for some 14 p.c. of the country’s outstand-
ing debt (or 11.5 p.c. of the country’s GDP), could greatly 
increase the risks of a wait-and-see solution.
Since the type of interference under review is of a formal 
legal nature, it can only be addressed by legally binding 
rules. It would therefore be useless to try to devise a 
solution through “the Principles” (see Box 1) or other 
kinds of gentlemen’s agreements.
As BITs may amplify collective action problems in two 
major respects, a solution favouring timely and orderly 
debt workouts should also address both aspects. First, as 
the additional enforcement mechanisms provided by BITs 
may give investors more scope and incentives to hold out 
and to litigate, the protection given should be curtailed in 
the case of a sovereign debt crisis. Second, the bilateral 
approach taken by BITs introduces preferential treatment 
features, making the necessary coordination among 
bondholders more difﬁ  cult. To avoid such problems in a 
sufﬁ  ciently general way, a multilateral approach is in order.
From a legal point of view, two solutions could be 
designed in the optimal form of multilateral instruments : 
a multilateral instrument dealing with international 
investment (6.1) and a multilateral instrument dealing 
with more orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises 
(6.2). These two solutions are not mutually exclusive  ; in 
order to avoid any conﬂ  ict such as those described under 
point  4.3, and therefore to ensure greater legal certainty, 
they could be complementary.164
6.1   Multilateral instrument dealing with 
international investment
The issue could be addressed from the “Investment 
Treaty” angle, with the insertion in every BIT of a carve-
out clause concerning public debt and/or sovereign debt 
crisis. However, this solution is not realistic, bearing in 
mind the growing and already daunting number of BITs. 
Moreover, this insertion would only work for the future, 
which would have an a contrario effect on the classiﬁ  ca-
tion of bonds as investments under existing BITs.
A multilateral instrument would not suffer from this 
drawback. 
The text of a multilateral carve-out clause would have to 
be very precise, in order not to exclude public debt entirely 
from the protection of an investment instrument. Indeed, 
some rules of investment law have a beneﬁ  cial function, 
such as the MFN clause for instance. Its text could be 
similar to one of those discussed during work on the MAI 
in the OECD :
“A breach by a government of a public debt obligation 
in the context of a general debt default or general debt 
restructuring, including an imminent debt default or 
restructuring, is not a breach of the MAI. Any general 
rescheduling or reorganisation of such public debt obliga-
tions is not subject to the MAI, and a sanctioning by a 
government of a general workout of debt contracted by 
private parties is not a breach of the MAI.
A general debt restructuring includes, but is not limited 
to, a debt restructuring in the Paris Club or the London 
Club. A breach of a public debt payment obligation by 
a government is a failure of a government, entity or 
enterprise controlled by a government, to make a timely 
payment of its obligation under :
a) a public debt instrument ; or
b) a governmental guarantee.
A public debt instrument includes a bond or note issued 
by a government, or a loan made to a government.”
A carve-out clause focused on disputes on sovereign debt 
default and sovereign debt restructuring could also be 
designed with regard to the settlement of investor-State 
disputes clause.
However, the success of such clauses presupposes the 
successful launching of work on such a multilateral instru-
ment (in the OECD, the WTO, or some other international 
organisation), and could only be ensured if the instrument 
were adopted by several countries, including those most 
concerned by sovereign debt crises, i.e. emerging market 
countries. If those countries did not adopt this multilateral 
instrument, their sovereign bonds would still fall within 
the scope of BITs.
6.2   Multilateral instrument dealing with more 
orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises
Another possibility would be to address the problem from 
the “Sovereign Crises Resolution” angle. Indeed, a multi-
lateral instrument dealing with a more orderly resolution 
of sovereign debt crises, enshrined in an international 
treaty, could contain some rules relating to other treaties, 
such as BITs.
One clause would provide a speciﬁ   c institution with 
exclusive competence over issues arising from a sovereign 
debt default and a sovereign debt restructuring.
A complementary clause would exclude the application 
of investment instruments (BITs or MAI) to sovereign debt 
default and sovereign debt restructuring.
However, as in the case of the solution described under 
point 6.1, and for the same reason, this kind of solution 
would only work if the treaty enshrining this multilateral 
instrument were globally ratiﬁ  ed.
This option would beneﬁ  t from a higher degree of trans-
parency when compared to the option presented under 
point 6.1, as all the features linked to a sovereign debt 
workout would be dealt with in the same instrument. 
It would also be more consistent, as it would not only 
ensure that BITs will no longer have the potential to 
interfere with the resolution of debt crisis, but would also 
establish in the same text the procedure to be followed 
in such cases.
To achieve this, works on such an instrument should be 
relaunched in international fora. Bearing in mind its expe-
rience on the SDRM and its almost universal membership, 
the IMF seems to be the appropriate place for doing so. In 
any case, the road ahead will be a long and difﬁ  cult one.165
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